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UK investment trust portfolio strategies
before the First World War†
By DIMITRIS P. SOTIROPOULOS , JANETTE RUTTERFORD,
and CAROLYN KEBER∗
UK investment trust companies were at the forefront of financial innovation during
the so-called first globalization era before the First World War. This study examines
their portfolio strategies in detail, using a unique dataset of 115 portfolio observations
for 30 different investment trust companies, comprising a total of 32,708 portfolio
holdings. Our results reveal strong performance and relatively sophisticated asset
management, which was based on a mixture of a buy-and-hold investment strategy
and active portfolio management. Investment trusts employed global rather than
domestic diversification. The early predominant investment in bonds in the 1880s
gradually declined in favour of ordinary and preferred shares. North and Latin
American markets were the main geographical target of UK investment trusts, with
less appetite for domestic investments and negligible interest in continental European
financial securities. There is significant cross-sectional variation in asset allocation
between investment trusts; they thus avoided herding behaviour in portfolio choice
and developed a wide range of different portfolio strategies.
U K investment trust companies were at the forefront of financial innovationduring the so-called first globalization era before the First World War. In the
wake of the increase in investment choice facilitated by the limited liability laws of
the 1850s and 1860s, the UK investment trust sector offered asset management
services to individual investors and became a low-cost financial vehicle for so-
called ‘averaging’ of risk, that is, diversifying risk across a portfolio of marketable
securities without having to sacrifice return. Formed as trusts from their initial
appearance in the late 1860s, by the 1880s the vastmajority of UK investment trusts
had acquired limited liability company status. These investment trust companies
issued shares and bonds (fixed interest securities) which were traded on the London
Stock Exchange (LSE) and other provincial stock exchanges. Such trusts generally
employed a global rather than a domestic diversification strategy and promoted
the principles of global diversification to the public, an approach later labelled the
‘scientific distribution of risk’.1
The initial success of the investment trust industry before the First World War
did not pass unnoticed among investors, analysts, and the press of the period. A
number of books and articles set out themain principles of the global diversification
∗Authors’ Affiliation: The Open University Business School.
† We would like to thank John Turner and the three anonymous referees for their suggestions and critical
comments. The responsibility for any remaining errors or omissions is of course ours alone.
1 For the general principles of UK investment trusts, see, for instance, Glasgow, Glasgow’s guide; Gilbert,
Investment trusts; Robinson, ‘British investment trusts’; Rutterford, ‘Investment trusts’.
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of risk.2 However, these studies did not go beyond an overview of the benefits
of diversification at the global level. Investment trusts’ actual portfolio strategies
remained an under-researched area. This was still true as late as the 1930s, when the
first empirical studies of the UK investment trust sector made their appearance.3
JohnMaynardKeynes reviewed one of these studies: the influential book on English
investment trusts byGeorgeGlasgow.4 As an experienced investor himself,5 Keynes
spotted the absence of any comprehensive discussion on or assessment of the
investment trust asset management strategies:
The bulk of the book is taken up by statistical tables, analyzing the dividend record, etc.,
so far as it has been published, of seventy-six companies. It would have added a good
deal to the interest of the book if there had been rather more material about the detailed
policy of the companies. For example, the distribution of the investments of those which
publish their lists might have been analyzed, not only at the present time, but also at
sundry past dates, so as to exhibit the changes of fashion which have passed from time
to time over the investment trust world.6
There is increasing interest from economic and business historians in investor
portfolio selection.7 Yet, to this day, there have been limited attempts to investigate
UK investment trust portfolio strategies.8 There is only one comprehensive study
on portfolio diversification by the Foreign and Colonial Investment Trust between
1880 and 1913.9 The present study aims to carry out further investigation of the
black box of investment trust diversification before the First World War, extending
the focus to a sample of investment trusts. To do so, it utilizes a unique hand-
collected dataset of 115 portfolio observations of 30 different investment trusts
between 1886 and 1914, comprising a total of 32,708 portfolio securities. It sheds
more light on the origins of the UK investment trust asset management industry.
How diversified were investment trust portfolios? Which types of securities did
these portfolios include? Towhich sectors were these trusts exposed?How extensive
was the portfolio diversification and how active was the asset management by
investment trust directors? Was their global diversification strategy successful in
relation to the rest of the financial sector?
Studying international financial flows at the macro level (for example, UK
capital exports to Argentina) has been one of the most exciting episodes in
economic history.10 However, very little is known about disaggregated decision
2 For instance, see Scratchley, Investment trusts. There were also several articles in the Economist and the Bankers’
Magazine; see Corner and Burton, Investment and unit trusts.
3 The first comprehensive studies on investment trusts by the Economist appeared only in the 1930s in the wake
of the 1929 stock exchange crash. However, from the beginning of the 1920s there was increasing interest in
the workings of the investment trust sector, as indicated by some articles in the Investor’s Monthly Manual (for
example, in May 1919, March 1920, March 1922, March 1924, April 1925, March 1926, and March 1927).
4 Glasgow, English investment trust companies.
5 For instance, see Chambers and Kabiri, ‘Keynes and Wall Street’.
6 Keynes, ‘Book review’, p. 142.
7 See Chambers and Kabiri, ‘Keynes and Wall Street’; Chambers, Dimson, and Foo, ‘Stock market investor’;
Sotiropoulos and Rutterford, ‘Individual investors’; Carlos, Fletcher, and Neal, ‘Share portfolios’.
8 Portfolio selection of other financial firms has attracted more attention in the period after the First World War;
see Scott, ‘Insurance companies’; Baker and Collins, ‘Insurance firms’.
9 Chambers and Esteves, ‘Foreign & Colonial’.
10 The particular emphasis here is on UK capital exports before the First World War—the period we study—and
their repercussions for the rate and pattern of economic growth. For instance, see Michie, Stock exchanges, pp.
99–131; Edelstein, Overseas investment; Davis and Huttenback, Pursuit of empire; Platt, Investment overseas.
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making at the micro level. The gradually increasing interest in the question of
financial decision making from a micro-perspective, including both individual and
institutional investors, aims to enhance our understanding of how different actors
in financial markets shaped the global geography of financial flows. This study
contributes to this literature by offering key insights into asset allocation strategies
by UK institutional investors.
Our results reveal a quite sophisticated approach to asset management by UK
investment trusts. The average investment trust in our sample had a portfolio
with a nominal value of £1.7 million, invested in 284 different securities. This
is clear evidence that asset management before the First World War was a
serious business. Investment trust directors adopted a mixture of a buy-and-
hold investment and active portfolio management strategies. Investment trusts
did not radically reorganize their portfolios on an annual basis but neither did
they stick to the same securities over time. Second, investment trusts were not
in general restricted by domestic preference; they pursued global diversification.
They evolved a unique asset allocation strategy—globally diversified; skewed in
favour of preferred regions, sectors, and security types; and with numerous
holdings—very different from the scientific global naive diversification strategy
recommended for individual investors at the time.11 Despite significant differences
between individual portfolio approaches at the investment trust level, there was
an overall flow of investment out of Europe to the benefit of emerging North and
Latin American markets. Third, in relation to conventional investment choice,
as reflected in securities listed on the LSE, investment trusts were on average
more reluctant to invest in government securities, and more attracted by non-
railway economic sectors than their importance in the LSE implied. There was
a wide variety of focus between different UK investment trusts; each tended to
have specific investment areas of interest, and these were not influenced by joint
directorships. Fixed interest securities dominated investment trust portfolios before
the First World War, but there was a growing interest in ordinary and preferred
shares over time.12 An increasing number of investment trusts were willing to
embrace the ‘cult of equity’ in the period up to the First World War. Fourth, our
calculations also show that global diversification by investment trusts offered higher
risk-adjusted returns to shareholders than did other financial companies. Although
larger portfolios tended to perform better than smaller ones, there is no evidence
that heterogeneity and variation in asset management with regard to security types,
economic sectors, or countries can explain cross-sectional performance. Individual
portfolio performance cannot only be assessed on the basis of the particular
portfolio selection at the company level.
11 For a detailed discussion of financial advice to investors before the First World War, see Sotiropoulos and
Rutterford, ‘Individual investors’.
12 In practice, preferred stocks and preferred shares could be viewed as a hybrid of bonds and ordinary shares.
‘Some preferred shares were close to bonds (in an economic, not legal, sense): they specified a rate of interest and
were cumulative (that is, if the dividend were not paid in one year, no dividend on the common could be paid
until the backlog had been made up), though (unlike bonds) they did not allow holders to foreclose if payments
were missed. Others—notably participating preferred (which shared residual profits after a basic dividend on
common stock had been paid)—resembled equities’; Hannah, ‘Finance fables’, p. 5. In the text, we distinguish
between fixed interest securities, which include bonds and debentures, and dividend-paying securities, which
include ordinary and preferred shares, even when they pay a fixed dividend.
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The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section I discusses in detail
our sample and the sources we used in this study. Sections II and III look at
investment trust diversification with respect to portfolio holdings and turnover.
Sections IV, V, and VI investigate portfolio structure in relation to investment in
different economic sectors, geographical regions, and security types. Section VII
addresses the issue of portfolio performance and discusses the relation between
performance and portfolio structure. Finally, section VIII summarizes the main
conclusions of the study.
I
Before the First World War, three different categories of investment trust can be
identified.13 The first category included holding and operating companies which
limited themselves to a particular market sector (such as tea, tin and other mineral
products, rubber, wool, railways, public utilities, and shipping), forgoing broader
diversification strategies. The second category of investment trusts comprised
essentially finance companies which, while they had a wider range of interests than
the first category, made no attempt to diversify risk. These financial trust companies
sometimes invested in non-stock-exchange assets (such as mortgages), or acted as
traders and dealers by earning fees from company promotions and underwriting
commissions. It is only the third category that applied the geographic distribution
of risk approach to their investment portfolios of marketable securities.14 In the
following analysis we use the term ‘investment trust’ for the companies in this
category and apply the term ‘financial trust’ to trust companies belonging to the
first two categories.15 The success of the Foreign and Colonial Government Trust
issues led to a rash of imitations—in this third category of trusts—that became
known as ‘average investment trusts’. This term was initially coined by Scratchley,
in his influential book on investment trusts published in 1875, to stress the fact
that the risk involved in the trusts of the third category was the average risk of the
underlying portfolio according to the principle of diversification.16
A study of the portfolio strategies of UK investment trusts faces two challenges:
first, to identify the investment trusts of the third category as opposed to the
financial trusts; and second, to discover comprehensive information about their
portfolio investments. With regard to the first challenge, a detailed list of English
and Scottish investment trusts is provided by the three studies made by George
Glasgow: one in 1930 on English investment trusts;17 one in 1932 on Scottish
13 See Robinson, ‘Investment trusts’, p. 288; Rutterford, ‘Investment trusts’, pp. 162–3; Corner and Burton,
Investment and unit trusts.
14 From the beginning of the twentieth century, a more sophisticated top-down approach to portfolio
diversification was gradually developed by investment advisers such as Henry Lowenfeld, drawing upon the
strategies of investment trusts. The focus was now explicitly on the idea of correlation and on reducing portfolio
risk by proper selection of uncorrelated, but equally volatile securities from all over the world. This strategy
continued with the concept of international diversification and further expanded and elaborated insights and
techniques already put in place by the 1870s by investment trust directors. This investment approach was coined
as geographical distribution of capital or risk; see Sotiropoulos and Rutterford, ‘Individual investors’; Rutterford
and Sotiropoulos, ‘Financial diversification’.
15 This distinction has also been introduced by Chambers and Esteves, ‘Foreign & Colonial’.
16 See Scratchley, Investment trusts. This term also appears in numerous investment trust prospectuses in the
same period.
17 Glasgow, English investment trust companies.
© 2020 The Authors. The Economic History Review published by John Wiley & Sons
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investment trusts;18 and one updated and revised study in 1935 of both English
and Scottish investment trusts.19 Glasgow’s studies offer important insights into the
workings of the investment trust industry from its origins up to the 1930s, carefully
distinguishing investment trusts from financial trusts that pursued a different
investment strategy.20 Not only did Glasgow provide a detailed list of investment
trusts for every year after their initial incorporation, but he also inspected their
portfolio holdings and annual accounts, indicating the particular date onwhich, say,
a financial trust converted into an average investment trust. These three Glasgow
studies are the main source we use to identify the investment trust sector as a
whole.
Identifying the investment trust sector is the first step. The second is to find
information about their portfolio investments. However, not all investment trusts
disclosed their investment holdings. The Scottish companies did not publish the
list of their investments, with only one exception: the Scottish Investment Trust.
Neither did all of the English trusts: only about half disclosed their investment
lists.21 It was only after the turmoil of 1929 that more investment trusts started
giving detailed information as to the structure of their investment portfolios.22
Our sample thus comprises those English investment trusts that published the
list of their investments and the single Scottish trust that was the exception to
the Scottish non-disclosing norm. These lists of portfolio holdings were published
together with the annual reports of investment trusts, and these can be found
at the Guildhall Library in London.23 We took pictures of all available lists of
holdings every five to six years between 1886 and 1914. Not all trusts reported
their investment lists consistently in every year. Table 1 offers an overview of
our sample. Figure 1 shows the number of firms in our sample in relation to all
existing incorporated UK investment trusts for the period up to 1914 according to
Glasgow’s studies. Our sample includes 115 annual portfolio observations (firm-
years) of 30 different investment trusts. These portfolio snapshots included 32,708
securities in total.
The lists of portfolio holdings include the full description of each security
held, accompanied by the total investment in the security at par value. From
the description of each security we were able in the great majority of the cases
to identify, first, its type (ordinary share, preferred share, or bond); second, its
geographical origin; and third, its function (economic sector). For instance, from
the following description, ‘Buenos Ayres and Pacific Railway 7 per cent Debenture
Stock’, we can assume that this is an Argentinian Railway fixed interest debenture.
This categorization by geographical region and economic sector serves as the basis
18 Glasgow, Scottish investment trust companies.
19 Glasgow, Glasgow’s guide.
20 For instance, all these company types were grouped together in the Stock Exchange Official Intelligence and in
the Stock Exchange Yearbook.
21 See Glasgow, Glasgow’s guide, p. xivi; Rutterford, ‘Investment trusts’; Ripley, Short history, pp. 126–7.
22 Before 1929, opinions were split as to whether portfolio holdings should be disclosed. The argument against
the disclosure was that it was impractical for investors to calculate the income and capital gains for the overall
portfolio and that the figure of inner reserves coupled with the distributed profits was a much better indication
of a trust’s overall performance. On the other hand, non-disclosure was considered equivalent to putting a blank
cheque in the hands of the directors. See Glasgow, Glasgow’s guide; Parkinson, Scientific investment.
23 Guildhall Library, London, Company Annual Reports.
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Table 1. Investment trust portfolios in our sample by firm and year
Name and year of
incorporation 1886 1891 1896 1900 1905 1911 1914 Total
Investment
limitations
1 Alliance Trust (1888) –  –  –   4 None
2 American Investment and
General Trust (1879)
       7 10%
a
3 Army and Navy Investment
Trust (1887)
–   – –   4 3.3%
b
4 Atlas Electric and General
Trust (1929)
– – –  – – – 1 5%
c
5 Bankers Investment Trust
(1888)
–       6 3.3%
b
6 Brewery and Commercial
Investment Trust (1890)
– –      5 None
7 Colonial Securities Trust
(1889)
– – –     4 None
8 Consolidated Trust (1889) –  –     5 3.3%
9 Debenture Securities
Investment (1895)
– –      5 2.5%
d
10 Foreign, American and
General Investments Trust
(1883)
       7 10%
11 Foreign and Colonial
Investment Trust (1879)
       7 10%
a
12 General and Commercial
Investment Trust (1888)
–       6 2%
13 Government Stock and
Other Securities
Investment (1871)
 –  –  – – 3 None
14 Guardian Investment Trust
(1888)
–       6 5%
15 Imperial Colonial Finance
and Agency Corporation
(1890)
– –  – – – – 1 2%
16 Industrial and General
Trust (1889)
– –      5 3%
17 International Investment
Trust (1888)
– –      5 5%
18 London and New York
Investment Corporation
(1889)
– – – – –   2 5%
19 London General
Investment Trust (1889)
– – –     4 None
20 London Trust (1889) – – – – –   2 None
21 Mercantile Investment and
General Trust (1884)
– – –   –  3 2.5%
a
22 Merchants Trust (1889) – – –     4 5%
23 Municipal Trust (1879) – – –     4 None
24 New Investment (1893) – – –     4 None
25 Omnium Investment
(1887)
   – –  – 4 None
26 Railway Debenture and
General Trust (1873)
– – – – – –  1 None
e
27 Scottish Investment Trust
(1887)
– – –  – – – 1 None
28 Second Industrial Trust
(1911)
– – – – – –  1 5%
© 2020 The Authors. The Economic History Review published by John Wiley & Sons
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Table 1. Continued
Name and year of
incorporation 1886 1891 1896 1900 1905 1911 1914 Total
Investment
limitations
29 Trust Union (1905) – – – – – –  1 None
30 United States and South
American Investment Trust
(1886)
–   –  – – 3 5%
a
No. of trusts 5 11 15 20 19 21 24 115
No. of securities 665 2,609 3,983 5,519 5,336 6,508 8,088 32,708
Notes:
a Except UK government bonds.
b Unless directors are unanimous about a larger investment.
c Except UK government and investments in La Sociedad Comercial de Montevideo.
d At least 95% to be in bonds.
e Confined to debentures.
Investment limitations in the memorandum and articles of association of each investment trust imposed a maximum % of the
total issued and paid-up capital that could be invested in any one security.
Source: Our dataset (see n. 23).
Figure 1. Number of incorporated UK investment trusts in our dataset in relation to
the number of UK investment trust companies
Notes: For a definition of investment trusts as opposed to financial trusts, see section I.
Sources: Our dataset (see n. 23) and Glasgow, Glasgow’s guide.
of our analysis in this study. Before we proceed with our data analysis, there are
three caveats that should be kept in mind with regard to our sample.
Our sample includes all the English investment trusts and the one Scottish
investment trust that disclosed the list of their portfolio holdings for the sampling
years listed in table 1. Are these trusts representative of the whole sector? In other
© 2020 The Authors. The Economic History Review published by John Wiley & Sons
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words, did the decision to disclose the list of their portfolio investments influence
an investment trust’s diversification strategy? In the absence of concrete evidence,
it is not easy to answer this question. In the discussions before the 1930s and
in related research, there is no indication that portfolio disclosure had an effect
on portfolio selection.24 We have thus no strong reason to assume that there is
self-selection bias in our sample and we believe that our sample is representative
of the whole sector.25 Online appendix table S1 compares the averages of several
corporate variables at the firm level between our sample (excluding the Scottish
Investment Trust) and the remaining English investment trust sector in 1914.
These data were collected from the Stock Exchange Yearbook. There is no evidence
of any statistically significant difference with respect to company paid-up capital,
leverage, number of directors, and performance. This shows that our sample is not
biased towards small or large trusts and does not embrace winners.26
Second, the lists of portfolio holdings that accompanied annual financial
statements reported nominal values. These values may have been quite different
from market values and indeed cost prices at purchase, which were the book values
in the balance sheet. Given the size of investment trust portfolios in our sample
(which includes securities traded on non-UK markets), estimating the market
value for every single security would be almost impossible. Unfortunately, price
indices for the full range of sectors, countries, and security types in investment
trust portfolios are not available. However, calculating the portfolio structure on
the basis of nominal values captures, we would argue, the big picture of portfolio
selection and is the best available choice despite its limitations. It is also the portfolio
data that investment trust directors chose to provide to investors.
Third, investment trusts operated a dual system of capital reserves: the capital
reserve disclosed on the balance sheet and another, so-called ‘inner’ or undisclosed
reserve, which was the difference between the market portfolio value and the
reported book portfolio value.When a capital gain was realized on sale of a security,
if disclosed capital reserves were deemed sufficient, the gain was often used to write
down the book value of either a new or an existing holding. The difference was
placed in the inner reserve. This might be done to compensate for a fall in market
value or just as a precaution against future falls. UK investment trusts thus used
part of their reserves (mostly those obtained from realized capital gains) to write
down book values of their holdings as a routine practice to reflect falls in market
values. In contrast, portfolio book values were never written up, no matter how
high the market value of the investment. This practice of write-downs added an
24 While there are many studies discussing different reporting strategies by investment trusts (for example,
Glasgow, Glasgow’s guide; Ripley, Short history; Gilbert, Investment trusts), we did not find any explicit reference
that relates portfolio disclosure to performance. Although the link between reporting norms and performance
requires a new study, our preliminary background analysis does not detect any link (see online app. tab. S1).
25 There were interlocking directorships between English and Scottish investment trusts, as well as more informal
connections between English and Scottish directors. It is thus highly unlikely that asset management in the north
and the south of the UK were completely separate worlds, or that Scottish investment trusts formed a separate
group.
26 In our results in online app. tab. S1 we do not see any statistical difference between English trusts that disclosed
their portfolio holdings and those that did not with regard to the nominal dividend yield, the (market) dividend
yield, and the rate of return on equity. In that sense, we argue that our sample does not appear to include winners.
There was not a single default of an incorporated ‘average’ investment trust before 1914, so the failure rate was
equal to zero. This is strikingly different from other financial firms or trusts, which were quite vulnerable to
financial instability episodes; see Chambers and Esteves, ‘Foreign & Colonial’, p. 2.
© 2020 The Authors. The Economic History Review published by John Wiley & Sons
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the investment trust portfolios in our sample
(115 firm-year observations)
Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Min. Quart. 1 Quart. 3 Max.
No. of holdings per portfolio 115 284.4 267.0 116.2 68.0 200.0 332.0 717.0
Ordinary shares 115 80.8 76.0 60.8 2.0 37.0 112.0 377.0
Preferred shares 115 49.7 44.0 33.2 1.0 27.0 61.5 155.0
Fixed interest securities 115 153.9 149.0 57.7 41.0 106.0 199.5 278.0
Different firms or
governments
115 212.6 200.0 83.7 45.0 154.0 246.5 529.0
Portfolio value (£ millions) 115 1.7 1.3 1.2 0.1 0.8 2.3 7.2
% ordinary shares 115 20.4 21.2 10.8 1.5 11.6 26.4 52.3
% preferred shares 115 14.8 13.8 8.7 0.7 9.5 19.6 44.3
% fixed interest securities 115 64.8 62.4 16.7 30.5 54.6 77.1 97.8
Value of the individual security
in £
115 5,926.7 4,898.8 4,240.2 1,018.8 3,322.1 20,624.9 31,814.6
Market dividend yield on
ordinary shares (%)
111 5.2 5.4 2.2 0.0 4.4 11.1 14.3
Nominal dividend yield on
ordinary shares (%)
113 4.9 5.0 2.5 0.0 3.5 10.0 15.0
Weight of the individual
security as % of portfolio
value
32,460 0.35 0.22 0.49 0.00 0.10 0.43 17.63
Domestic 8,113 0.28 0.16 0.39 0.00 0.07 0.34 5.71
Non-domestic 23,759 0.38 0.24 0.52 0.00 0.11 0.47 17.63
Ordinary shares 9,144 0.26 0.13 0.42 0.00 0.05 0.29 12.45
Preferred shares 5,638 0.30 0.19 0.42 0.00 0.09 0.37 10.30
Fixed interest securities 17,678 0.42 0.28 0.53 0.00 0.15 0.51 17.63
Single firm or government 24,450 0.47 0.27 0.71 0.00 0.12 0.55 24.75
Notes: We aggregate all variables at the level of the portfolio before we calculate the descriptive statistics for the first panel of the
table. As opposed to the results of fig. 5, which are based on the Investor’s Monthly Manual for the period 1895–1913, the rate of
return in this table is for the trusts and years covered by our sample.
Source: Our dataset (see n. 23).
extra protection layer for investors against adverse financial events by discounting
potential losses in advance. Investment trusts usually excluded from the lists of
disclosed investments those holdings the cost of which had been wholly written off.
In other words, securities whose book value was eventually written down to zero
stopped appearing in the lists. This introduces a small bias in our results, which
did not take into consideration the portfolio holdings that were excluded from
the detailed lists of investments. Nevertheless, the weight of excluded holdings
compared to the overall portfolio value was very small and thus has little effect on
our results.27
II
This section provides an overview of the diversification of UK investment trusts
before the First World War. Table 2 reports cross-sectional calculations, so it does
not capture variation over time. The average investment trust portfolio in our
sample has a value of £1.7 million invested in a total of 284 different securities.
27 In the very few cases in which we were able to identify the excluded securities for some years, their overall
weight in the total portfolio value was very small, less than 1%.
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This portfolio value is equivalent to about £1.4 billion in 2017 (using economic
output as a relative measure) and is clear evidence that asset management before
the First World War was a serious business.28
How does this figure compare with the British financial sector in general before
the FirstWorldWar? According to our full dataset, in 1914 there were 84 investment
trusts (including those which did not disclose the list of their portfolio holdings)
with average paid-up capital of £1.2 million. This figure, which reflects the size of
the portfolio, is considerably higher than the average paid-up capital of other UK
financial firms. According to the estimations of Essex-Crosby,29 the average paid-
up capital in 1915 was £0.8 million for all trusts (that is, both average and financial
trusts); £0.4 million for Financial, Land, and Investment companies; £0.2 million
for insurance companies; and £1.0 million for banks. This is another indication of
the importance of professional asset management in relation to the UK financial
sector in general.30
There is substantial cross-sectional variation in the number of portfolio holdings,
but this number was never lower than 68.31 Three-quarters of investment trust
portfolios included more than 200 securities (quartile 1), with some of them
exceeding 500 securities. For instance, in 1900, the portfolio of Mercantile
Investment and General Trust comprised 582 holdings. In 1911, International
Investment Trust had a portfolio of 571 securities, while the portfolio of Industrial
and General Trust reached 717 holdings in 1914. On average, portfolios comprised
as many as 213 different firms or governments. All this is evidence of an
extraordinary level of portfolio diversification. It also indicates significant asset
management skills and knowledge of the market by the directors who ran these
investment trusts. Indeed, many studies of the investment trust sector before the
1930s made the explicit point that the mere ‘machinery’ of diversification was by
no means enough to guarantee successful investment performance; management
skills were equally, if not more, important.32
The average portfolio holding represented only 0.35 per cent of portfolio nominal
value, while 75 per cent of holdings did not have individual weights of more than
0.43 per cent of portfolio nominal value. This is further evidence of the extent of
diversification pursued by investment trusts. Despite a few outliers, 99 per cent of
holdings were not worth individually more than 2.2 per cent of portfolio value (this
28 We have used the Measuring Worth website for our estimation (https://www.measuringworth.com). There are
several ways to ascertain the present value of £1.7 million in 1914. Our estimation measures the amount of wealth
relative to the total output of the economy.
29 Essex-Crosby, Joint stock companies, p. 222. These calculations are based on a sample of 80 banks, 102
insurance companies, 147 trusts, and 518 financial, land, and investment companies.
30 We should note that, during the same period, many ordinary shares of banks and insurance companies
maintained a large uncalled component, at the level of 70% of the nominal value. Uncalled capital was low for the
land, mortgage, and financial firms (at the level of 20% of the nominal value) and negligible for trust companies.
See Campbell, Grossman, and Turner, ‘Monthly indices’. The presence of uncalled capital indicates more risk,
as it is effectively a form of gearing. On the other hand, banks and insurance companies did not issue bonds or
preference shares, unlike most investment trusts, which means less leverage and offsets the risk related to uncalled
capital.
31 The time variation (not reported in tab. 2) in the number of portfolio holdings is low. This means that
individual investment trusts did not over time significantly change their paid-up nominal capitalization and thus
the overall value of their portfolio investment. The results of tab. 2 are not driven by newcomers in the dataset.
32 See Glasgow, Glasgow’s guide, p. xix; Campbell, ‘Investment trusts’; Scratchley, Investment trusts; Parkinson,
Scientific investment.
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Table 3. Portfolio turnover and concentration
Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Min. Quart. 1 Quart. 3 Max.
Portfolio concentration
Portfolio share of the top 10 largest holdings 115 20.4 19.2 6.9 9.3 15.9 22.8 44.4
Portfolio share of the top 10% largest holdings 115 35.7 35.3 5.3 21.3 32.6 39.0 49.4
Portfolio share of the top 25% largest holdings 115 60.0 59.6 5.8 45.1 56.4 63.4 76.4
Portfolio share of the top 50% largest holdings 115 82.7 82.3 4.7 71.5 80.2 84.6 97.2
Value of portfolio turnover per year (% portfolio
value)
Purchases 76 14.7 12.4 8.5 0.3 9.7 17.5 66.8
Sales 76 11.1 10.3 3.8 5.4 8.8 12.3 33.0
Turnover 76 10.4 9.6 3.1 0.3 8.4 12.0 19.5
Removed debentures 76 5.4 5.1 2.2 1.2 4.0 6.9 12.0
Notes: Our calculations are based on nominal values, which make it possible to distinguish purchases and sales from capital
appreciation and depreciation. Purchases are equal to the value of holdings which either were bought or whose investment was
increased in nominal terms, as a ratio to nominal portfolio value in t. Sales are equal to the nominal value of holdings that either
were sold or whose investment was reduced in nominal terms, as ratio to nominal portfolio value in t – 1 (that is, the previous
sampling year).
Source: Our dataset (see n. 23).
figure is not reported in the table). Investment trusts invested on average no more
than 0.47 per cent of their portfolio value in a single firm or government.33
III
To have a better understanding of asset management by investment trusts we
need to look at portfolio concentration and turnover. Table 3 shows the extent
to which investment trusts had balanced portfolios and offers some information
on the estimated annual turnover of investment trust portfolios. With respect to
concentration, the table shows that portfolios were far from being balanced with
equal-sized holdings. Indeed, the top 10 per cent of nominal holdings per portfolio
represented on average 35.7 per cent of total portfolio nominal value, while the top
25 per cent of holdings by nominal value represented on average 60.0 per cent of
portfolio value. Although there is some variation in portfolio concentration across
trusts, it is evident that directors managed skewed—rather than equally weighted—
portfolios. However, neither do we observe extreme portfolio polarization. These
investment trust portfolios therefore do not follow the recommendations which
were being made at the time to individual investors by the proponents of scientific
investment and globally diversified portfolios with equal weights in each region.34
Another interesting finding of table 3 is related to the annual turnover of the
investment trust portfolios. There are different ways in which turnover can be
measured: as the ratio of sales divided by portfolio value; as the ratio of the average
of sales plus purchases to portfolio value; and as the ratio of the lower of sales
33 Tab. 1 reports the investment limitations in the memorandum and articles of association of each investment
trust. These limitations imposed amaximum percentage of the total issued and paid-up capital that can be invested
in any one security. Twelve trusts did not have any investment limitation, while investment limitations for the rest
varied between 2% and 10%. In practice, these limitations did not impose any actual constraint. As shown in
tab. 2, investment trusts were massively more diversified than the minimum requirements of their incorporation.
34 See Lowenfeld, Investment; Sotiropoulos and Rutterford, ‘Individual investors’.
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and purchases to portfolio value.35 Portfolio value can be measured as the market
value of the portfolio at the beginning of the measurement period, the average of
the beginning and end period portfolio values, or the average of the sub-periods
during the period where these are available, for example, monthly values during a
year.
In order to estimate turnover, following Chambers and Esteves, we infer
differences in portfolio holdings in any given year from changes in security holdings
from the previous sampling year.36 Our dataset does not have annual portfolio
observations, so the changes in the value of portfolio holdings due to purchases
or sales of securities can only be calculated for a period of three to five years
(according to our sampling years; see table 1). When we calculate the portfolio
turnover between two consecutive sampling years, t1 and t2, we divide our result
by the difference t2-t1 to get a proxy of the annual change. Our results therefore
underestimate the actual annual portfolio turnover because they cannot capture
transactions in which securities were bought after t1 and sold before t2. These
securities will not leave any ‘trace’ in t1 and t2. It is hard to estimate the significance
of the element of turnover that escapes our calculations. The results in table 3
still offer an idea of how active asset management by investment trusts was,
providing a conservative estimate of portfolio turnover. Table 3 shows the average
turnover using the lower of sales and purchases. We also show purchases and
sales separately. Portfolio purchases include both investment in new holdings and
additional investment in existing holdings between t1 and t2. Similarly, portfolio
sales include both removed holdings and reduced investment in existing holdings.
On average, sales represent 11.1 per cent of portfolio investment per year and
purchases 14.7 per cent. The average portfolio turnover is 10.4 per cent using
the same definition as Chambers and Esteves, for comparative purposes: the ratio
of the lower of sales and purchases to portfolio value. For Foreign and Colonial
Investment Trust, for the same period of 1880 to 1913, Chambers and Esteves
indicate an average turnover of 20 per cent, using annual data and market prices.37
Our results offer a much lower annual average turnover for the period, which is
around half of their estimate. When we measure turnover for the same investment
trust for the same period but using fewer sampling years and nominal values, we
obtain an average turnover figure, using their preferred definition, of about 10
per cent. If we were to assume that all investment trusts followed the portfolio
management strategies of Foreign and Colonial Investment Trust, it seems that
table 3 may underestimate actual portfolio turnover.
The difference between our sample estimate and the point estimate for Foreign
and Colonial by Chambers and Esteves is most likely due to the particularly
35 The variation between these measures is smaller for closed-end funds, which regularly reinvest sales proceeds,
than for open-ended funds, which may choose to not reinvest and retain proceeds as cash. The lower of purchases
and sales measure is preferred by open-end fundmanagers as this provides the lowest possible measure of turnover.
Chambers and Esteves, ‘Foreign & Colonial’, use this measure. We also follow Chambers and Esteves. See notes
to tab. 3 for more details. Since we use nominal values for portfolio value estimates, there is little change in
closed-end funds unless new shares or loans are issued. Chambers and Esteves use market values, which are likely
to change more from year to year, although they say that their results are similar when using par values; see ibid.,
p. 7, n. 25. The ‘lower of sales and purchases’ rule hides the amount of turnover which is hidden in purchases,
when there is new issue of paid-up liabilities capital.
36 See ibid., p. 7.
37 Ibid., p. 8.
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radical asset allocation shift from foreign government bonds to corporate securities
adopted by Foreign and Colonial during the period, and to the fact that we do
not observe all years, only sampling years.38 If we view the 10.4 per cent turnover
as an underestimate due to sampling year choice and if the estimate for Foreign
and Colonial is on the high side, given radical asset changes during the period,
we can assume an average turnover of, say, 15 per cent. Still, this figure is higher
than modern-day index funds, whose turnover is less than 5 per cent a year, but
comparable to a low turnover active fund. Investment trusts did not radically
reorganize their portfolios on an annual basis, but neither did they hold on to the
same securities over the long term.39 For example, according to our calculations
for five of the older trusts in our sample,40 about 40 per cent per cent of securities
in 1896 survived until 1905 and only 20 per cent of them until 1914. There does
not seem to be a significant core portfolio that investment trusts preserved over
time.
One possible caveat in our argument could be that portfolio management was
not as ‘active’ as we argue because investment trusts had to replace maturing or
redeemed bonds. In the majority of bond descriptions in the investment lists we
do not find the year of maturity nor do we know whether bonds held by trusts
were bought in.41 So we cannot be precise on how much of the turnover that
we observe was simply due to bonds being redeemed. However, as we can see in
table 3, the average removal of bonds per year was 5.4 per cent of the nominal
portfolio value. Even if the trusts had no say in whether or not to sell these bonds,
there still remains turnover not explicable by forced redemptions and therefore
due to active management redemptions. In practice, our inspection of the dataset
indicates that a significant part of the bond removals was not related to ‘forced’
redemptions.42
IV
This section discusses the global exposure of investment trust portfolios. Figure 2
presents the investment profile (total average and box plots to capture dispersion
per available year) of the trusts in our sample across different parts of the world.
The horizontal line in each chart shows the GDP in 1913 for the corresponding
38 Portfolio investment in government bonds fell from 70% in 1886 to 20% in 1914.
39 A buy-and-hold strategy was particularly attractive to wealthy individual investors before 1914; Sotiropoulos
and Rutterford, ‘Financial diversification’.
40 This sub-sample of trusts includes the American Investment and General Trust; the Foreign, American and
General Investments Trust; the Foreign and Colonial Investment Trust; the General and Commercial Investment
Trust; and the Guardian Investment Trust. The calculations are not reported in tab. 3.
41 Corporate bonds typically had a maturity date in their title, but the actual redemption date could be earlier
through the use of such mechanisms as sinking funds. The redemption date shown for UK government bonds
tended to be the earliest maturity date after which the UK government could opt to redeem or not, as it preferred,
such as 2.5% Consols issued in 1903 with a first possible redemption date of 1923 but not redeemed until 2015.
Foreign government bonds had a date in their title which was the year of issue, not the year of maturity.
42 For instance, at least 60.5% of bonds held by Merchants Trust in 1911 in terms of nominal value had a
maturity date after 1914. This is a very conservative estimate based on securities for which we were able to
identify the redemption year. The actual figure could of course be much higher. Debentures representing about
18.2% of portfolio value in nominal terms in 1911 did not appear in the 1914 portfolio. At least half of these
security removals (this is also a very conservative estimation) in terms of nominal value had maturity after 1914
and cannot be considered as a forced ‘sale’ but the result of active management.
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Figure 2. Investment trust portfolio regional allocation (% of portfolio nominal value)
Notes: Our calculations are based on the reported nominal portfolio values. The horizontal line depicts the regional share of the
world GDP in 1913 as %. The boxplot for the year 1886 is omitted because there are only five investment trust portfolios in our
dataset. Russia has been included in the Asia/Pacific region. North America includes the US and Canada, and Latin America the
rest of the American continent.
Sources: Our dataset (see n. 23) and Maddison,World economy, p. 641.
geographical region expressed as a percentage share of world GDP. In the absence
of a market capitalization-weighted global benchmark for the historical period up
to the First World War, we follow Chambers and Esteves in using Maddison’s data
on the distribution of global GDP to create a GDP-weighted benchmark for the
year 1913.43 The assumption is that the share of world GDP very roughly reflects
the relative size of domestic financial market capitalization and development in
different parts of the world.44
43 Chambers and Esteves, ‘Foreign & Colonial’.
44 This global market capitalization benchmark is far from perfect; see Hannah, ‘Finance fables’. Our assumption
just helps us make some general comparisons.
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During the period up to the First World War, domestic investment never
exceeded 26 per cent of the portfolio value on average across our sample, although
there is a clear upward trend between 1886 and 1905 when the increase stops.
This average freeze in domestic investment might have been a response to the poor
performance of UK securities as opposed to non-domestic ones in terms of real
returns between 1897 and 1909.45 In any case, it is obvious that investment trust
portfolios were not restricted by domestic preference. UK investment trusts clearly
pursued a global diversification strategy.
How did non-domestic portfolio investment compare with the share of non-
domestic securities in British financial markets? It is very hard to offer an accurate
estimation of the latter before the First World War.46 If one looks only at the LSE,
according toMichie’s estimations, non-domestic paid-up capital represented about
half of the total paid-up capitalization at par values and increased from 46.2 per
cent in 1893 to 53.2 per cent by 1913.47 The LSE may well have been the most
obvious market for investment trusts to look for marketable securities, especially for
the English investment trusts which had their headquarters in London.48 However,
the LSE was by no means the only market available. There were also the unofficial
list, the provincial stock exchanges, and foreign stock exchanges. Given that the
unofficial list and the provincial stock exchanges were much less international in
their listings than the LSE, the actual share of non-domestic securities in British
financial markets was probably lower than the non-domestic share of the LSE in
paid-up values. This makes the international exposure of the UK investment trusts,
which never fell below 75 per cent on average, even more striking in relation to the
overall UK market.
The great bulk of non-domestic investment went to North and Latin America.
North America, which includes the US and Canada in our calculations, accounted
for 21.4 per cent of world GDP in 1913 but attracted on average one-third of
portfolio investment by investment trusts before 1914, as shown in figure 2 and
table 4. One would expect this result. During the pre-First World War period, the
US was the ‘single most important source of new security issues in the British
capital market’.49
The other economic zone favoured by investment trusts in the sample was
Latin America. In figure 2, the average portfolio exposure of investment trusts is
strikingly above the share of Latin America in world GDP. The particular interest
in Latin American securities by British investors has already been highlighted
45 According to Edelstein’s calculations, the geometric mean of real returns of UK securities (equity, preferred
shares, and debentures) between 1897 and 1909 was only 1.35% per year as opposed to the 5.20% real return
offered by non-domestic securities. Railways and canals and docks were among the sectors that were hit hard
during this period. See Edelstein, Overseas investment, pp. 148, 153.
46 Hannah, ‘London Stock Exchange’; Platt, Investment overseas.
47 Michie, Stock exchanges, p. 52.
48 Scottish investment trusts did not have their registered offices in London, although they occasionally chose
the LSE to list some of their securities.
49 See Simon, ‘British portfolio investment’, pp. 43–4. During the period before the First World War, the US was
borrowing from abroad, although proportionately less so than it did during the peak of the 1870s and 1880s; see
Platt, Investment overseas, p. 91. After the 1890s, British investment in the US declined as the US moved gradually
towards a national capital market; see Davis, ‘Investment market’, p. 392. Portfolio investment in Canadamirrored
the economic size of the country, which represented 2.5% of world GDP in 1913. Canada attracted on average
about 2.2% of portfolio investment before 1914. The great majority of foreign investment in Canada was supplied
from Britain; see Platt, Investment overseas, p. 103; Edelstein, Overseas investment, pp. 304–5.
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Table 4. Average investment trust portfolio regional allocation in selected countries
(% of portfolio nominal value)
1886 1891 1896 1900 1905 1911 1914 Total
UK 4.3 8.2 14.4 20.0 25.3 24.8 23.8 20.0
Europe 15.5 8.2 5.3 4.2 3.0 3.0 4.8 4.9
Spain 6.7 3.4 2.5 2.2 1.3 1.5 3.5 2.5
Greece 0.8 1.2 0.9 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7
Italy 3.3 1.8 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.6
Other 4.8 1.9 1.2 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.6 1.1
North America 34.4 33.2 38.2 35.2 29.7 29.7 33.9 33.2
US 31.0 31.0 36.5 33.6 28.1 28.3 30.0 31.0
Canada 3.4 2.2 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.3 3.9 2.2
Latin America 30.7 42.7 35.0 33.0 30.8 33.6 28.7 32.9
Argentina 15.0 21.5 16.4 15.7 13.6 14.0 11.3 14.8
Mexico 1.5 8.0 6.5 6.0 4.3 4.3 4.2 5.1
Brazil 9.0 4.4 4.0 3.4 4.1 4.2 5.0 4.4
Chile 1.1 0.6 1.7 1.8 2.7 2.5 1.5 1.9
Uruguay 0.2 2.4 1.9 1.8 1.8 2.2 2.0 1.9
Cuba 1.1 0.9 0.8 1.0 1.0 2.8 2.2 1.5
Costa Rica 0.6 1.8 1.1 1.0 1.3 1.1 0.5 1.0
Other 2.1 3.1 2.6 2.3 2.0 2.5 1.9 2.3
Africa 4.0 1.4 1.7 1.2 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.7
Latin Africa 0.2 0.4 0.9 0.6 1.0 1.1 1.2 0.9
Other 3.8 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.8
Asia/Pacific 10.8 6.1 5.0 5.5 8.8 6.5 6.0 6.5
Australia 1.4 0.7 1.8 1.7 2.9 2.0 1.7 1.9
Turkey 4.6 1.9 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.8
India 1.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.7
Russia 0.8 1.0 0.2 0.3 1.0 0.9 0.6 0.7
Japan 1.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.5
Other 1.1 1.6 1.5 1.9 2.9 2.1 2.3 2.1
Unspecified 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.9 0.6 0.7 1.0 0.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: All reported portfolio weights by country are in nominal values. Russia has been included in the Asia/Pacific region. North
America includes the US and Canada, and Latin America the rest of the American continent.
Source: Our dataset (see n. 23).
in the literature.50 Argentina gets the lion’s share of Latin American portfolio
investment in table 4, averaging about 15 per cent of average investment trust
portfolio share for the whole period, which makes it the second most important
destination for investment trust portfolio investment after the larger and more
developed US. Argentina was a fast-developing economy, with immense natural
advantages, and strong agricultural and commercial sectors. This may explain the
investment interest, which was strong not only among British investors.51 Mexico
and Brazil come after Argentina in table 4, with 5.1 per cent and 4.4 per cent
average investment trust portfolio share. Both Mexico and Brazil were also known
as large capital importers from the UK and it seems that investment trusts followed
the general convention.52
The focus of investment trusts on North and Latin American securities offset
portfolio investment in the rest of the world. Africa attracted on average only
50 Platt, ‘Canada and Argentina’.
51 Edelstein, Overseas investment, pp. 303–4; Dı´az Alejandro, Argentine economy, pp. 6–8.
52 Platt, Investment overseas, p. 92.
© 2020 The Authors. The Economic History Review published by John Wiley & Sons
Ltd on behalf of Economic History Society.
Economic History Review, 0, 0 (2020)
UK INVESTMENT TRUST PORTFOLIO STRATEGIES 17
1.7 per cent portfolio investment in nominal terms, but this is comparable
to its share in world GDP (as an indication of financial development). On
the other hand, portfolio investment in Europe was very low. In the closing
decades of the nineteenth century, continental securities declined in importance in
British financial markets, France and Germany attained financial sufficiency, and
European markets replaced London as borrowing centres for eastern and southern
Europe.53 For these reasons, Europe stopped being a priority for British investors,
and investment trusts were no exception.54 Finally, Asia and the Pacific region were
also not favoured destinations for portfolio investment. Both Australia and New
Zealand had limited need for portfolio investment before the First World War and
India, Japan, and Russia were not popular destinations for portfolio investment
from the investment trust sector.55
V
How did investment trusts allocate portfolio investment across different sectors by
function and how does this compare with the market? Figure 3 shows the sectoral
portfolio allocation of the investment trust portfolio holdings. For each sector, we
compare the results of our sample with the sector’s share expressed as a percentage
of the LSE paid-up listed capital.56 The same caveat as before applies here. The
LSE was probably the most obvious market for investment trust portfolios but not
the only available choice. The LSE share by sectors in nominal terms is a very
rough benchmark with which to assist our discussion.
On average, investment trusts were relatively less keen on government securities
than was the LSE as a whole. In addition, the importance of government securities
in investment trust portfolios declined faster than the overall LSE trend over the
period 1880 to 1914. In 1914, the average investment trust portfolio exposure in
government bonds was only 6 per cent, without much variation across trusts. This
figure is lower than the share of government securities in LSE paid-up capital,
which was around 41 per cent.57 The Argentinian government was by far the
largest recipient of investment trust money in government securities (see table 6),
while only a tiny part of portfolio investment in the government sector went to UK
government debt, which did not offer attractive returns at the time.58
The average portfolio investment in railways was comparable to the overall LSE
share. Railway portfolio investment varied a great deal across different investment
trusts, indicating very different portfolio strategies. Companies such as the Brewery
and Commercial Investment Trust and the London General Investment Trust had
a relatively low preference for railway securities, which never exceeded 15 per cent
of their portfolio nominal values. Other companies had more interest in railways.
53 Feis,World’s banker, pp. 18–19.
54 Edlinger, Merli, and Parent, ‘World portfolio’, have argued that the ‘European preference’ of the Paris Bourse
was not inefficient from a modern portfolio theory point of view.
55 Platt, Investment overseas, p. 96; Butlin, Australian domestic produce, pp. 423–34. According to the latter, British
investment in Australia picked up in the 1880s but gradually declined in the following two decades.
56 For every year and sector in fig. 3, we obtained the LSE paid-up listed capital from the Stock Exchange Official
Intelligence.
57 Low investment in government securities by investment trusts has been discussed by Morgan and Thomas,
Stock exchange, p. 178.
58 Edelstein, Overseas investment, p. 125.
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Figure 3. Investment trust portfolio sectoral allocation (% of portfolio nominal value)
Notes: Our calculations are based on the reported nominal values in the investment trust annual reports, for the investment trust
sector, and the Stock Exchange Official Intelligence, for the LSE, which offers annually the aggregated nominal value per sector.
The boxplot for the year 1886 is omitted because there are only five investment trusts in our dataset. ICA: industrial, commercial,
and agricultural sectors.
Sources: Our dataset (see n. 23) and the Stock Exchange Official Intelligence, 1886–1914.
The portfolio investment in railways by the American Investment and General
Trust never fell below 60 per cent and fluctuated between 45 per cent and 62 per
cent for the General and Commercial Investment Trust. Average nominal portfolio
exposure in railways did not change even when real returns on railway securities
plummeted after the second half of the 1890s.59
59 For domestic railways, declines in return of capital employed hit share prices and investors made little or
no money in real terms after 1897; see Mitchell, Chambers, and Crafts, ‘British railways’. Edelstein, Overseas
investment, pp. 153–4, estimates that realized rates of return for domestic railways during 1897–1909 were -0.83%
for ordinary shares, 1.02% for preferred shares, and 0.64% for debentures. Non-domestic railways performed
better during this period but also declined significantly after 1909.
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Table 5. Portfolio investment in average and financial trusts in 1911
Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Min. Quart. 1 Quart. 3 Max.
Portfolio investment in trusts
(% total)
21 6.07 5.71 3.49 0.00 4.00 13.87 14.57
Portfolio investment in trusts
with joint directorships
(% total)
21 2.49 1.76 2.28 0.00 0.73 7.10 7.19
Portfolio investment in trusts
with no joint directorships
(% total)
21 3.58 3.82 2.02 0.00 2.38 7.12 7.38
No. of portfolio holdings
invested in trusts
21 18.95 19.00 10.50 0.00 12.00 34.80 35.00
No. of portfolio holdings
invested in trusts as % of
total no. of holdings
21 6.14 6.16 2.88 0.00 4.73 11.03 11.25
Value of individual holding
(as % of portfolio value)
invested in trusts with joint
directorships
76 0.69 0.46 0.76 0.00 0.20 3.29 4.99
Value of individual holding
(as % of portfolio value)
invested in trusts with no
joint directorships
214 0.35 0.19 0.47 0.00 0.10 2.80 2.97
Notes: In order to calculate investment in trusts with joint directorships, we identified all possible interlocking directorships
with average investment trusts as well as with other financial trusts from the Directory of Directors. The data for the interlocking
directorships for 1911 were taken from the study of Sotiropoulos, Rutterford, and van Lieshout, ‘Professional asset management’.
Source: Our dataset (see n. 23) and Directory of Directors.
The relative reluctance of investment trusts to invest in government securities,
in relation to the LSE, was offset by the relatively higher exposure in all remaining
economic sectors other than railways. The most striking example is, perhaps,
utilities. The paid-up capital of utilities in the LSE reached its pre-First World War
peak in 1914 when it accounted for 4.4 per cent of total paid-up capitalization.
In that year, the average investment trust portfolio share in utilities was almost 20
per cent, with a maximum value of 30.6 per cent (for the Municipal Trust) and a
minimum of 10.2 per cent (for the Bankers Investment Trust). Similarly, during
the whole period, portfolio investment in financial firms was higher than for the
LSE but gradually converged to the LSE figure over time. For all these non-railway
economic sectors, there is significant variation in individual portfolio strategies.
Perhaps the most striking example is investment in the industrial, commercial,
and agriculture (ICA) sectors. In 1905, both the Debenture Securities Investment
Trust and the London General Investment Trust held almost 60 per cent of their
portfolio nominal value in ICA firms. On the contrary, in the very same year, the
Foreign and Colonial Investment Trust and the Municipal Trust held no more
than 7 per cent of their nominal portfolio values in ICA securities.
Investment trusts also invested proportionately more in other investment and
financial trust companies than the importance of these companies on the LSE,
as shown in figure 3. This is an interesting finding that indicates some important
cross-investment between trusts. Table 5 gives a more detailed picture of cross-
holdings between trusts. It shows portfolio investment in trusts (both investment
and financial) in 1911, for which date our sample contains 21 companies. To obtain
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these figures, we used the annual publication of the Directory of Directors to identify
all interlocking directorships between the investment trusts in our sample for 1911
and the trusts (both average and financial) in which they invested.60 Investment in
trusts represented about 6 per cent of portfolio par value, which was equivalent to
about 19 different holdings. There seems to be some variation between investment
trusts with regard to their investment in other trusts, but no particular preference
for trusts with which they had joint directorships. There are some cases of rather
extreme exposure, such as the New Investment trust which invested 14.57 per cent
of its portfolio nominal value in other trusts, equally split between trusts with which
it shared directors and those with which it did not. New Investment was consistent
in its portfolio exposure to other trusts throughout the whole period before the
First World War, a strategy that was not as popular with other investment trusts.
Also, as we can see in table 5, investment in other trusts was not limited to a
single holding/exposure. There are a few exceptions, the most notable being the
investment of about 5 per cent of nominal portfolio value of New Investment trust
in the deferred stock of Mercantile Investment and General Trust, with which the
New Investment trust shared two out of its three directors.
VI
We now focus on portfolio allocation across types of securities. The results are
reported in figure 4. The results support Robinson’s argument, made in 1930,
according to which: ‘from earliest days the British investment trusts have been
primarily buyers of bonds, and this is true today, although a growing appreciation
of equities is evident’.61 Indeed, fixed interest securities on average dominated
investment trust portfolios before the First World War. In 1886 and 1891 the
average portfolio share of fixed interest securities was over 80 per cent, but this
figure declined to 58 per cent by the eve of the First World War. This declining
trend was accompanied by a rise in the variation of portfolio strategies with
regard to different types of securities. For example, in 1891, American Investment
and General Trust, Foreign and Colonial Investment Trust, and General and
Commercial Investment Trust invested more than 90 per cent of their portfolios in
bonds. The lowest portfolio investment in bonds in the same year was 68 per cent
by the Guardian Investment Trust. The picture is very different some years later
in 1914. We still find companies with a strong preference for bonds, such as the
Debenture Securities Investment Company, with 86 per cent of its portfolio share
in bonds, or the Foreign and Colonial Investment Trust, with 80 per cent portfolio
share in bonds. However, over the period, an increasing number of investment
trusts became willing to embrace the ‘cult of equity’. For instance, the Industrial
and General Trust had only 30 per cent of its portfolio invested in fixed interest
securities, while the fixed interest portfolio share was 32 per cent for London Trust
and 39 per cent for Trust Union. Figure 4 reveals that, on average, investment
trusts became keener over time to include both ordinary and preferred shares in
their portfolios, but variation in individual portfolio strategies was also very high.
60 The Directory of Directors lists the directors of principal companies whose securities were traded on UK stock
markets, giving the name, address, and the companies under their directorship.
61 Robinson, ‘Investment trusts’, p. 287.
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Figure 4. Investment trust portfolio allocation according to security type (% of portfolio
nominal value)
Notes: Our calculations are based on the reported nominal values in the investment trust annual reports. The boxplot for the year
1886 is omitted because there are only five investment trusts in our dataset.
Source: Our dataset (see n. 23).
Table 6 presents cross-sectional descriptive statistics for the three different
categories of securities (ordinary shares, preferred shares, and bonds). It shows the
10 highest average portfolio exposures by country, sector, and security type. The
great bulk of fixed interest investment went to US railways, US and UK ICA firms
(this category groups together industrial and commercial firms with agricultural
firms), but also to Latin American government and railway securities. The results
of table 6 indicate that there is significant variation in individual portfolio strategies
with respect to security type. Many investment trusts were ready to invest heavily
in particular countries and sectors via bonds; for example, as much as 75.9 per
cent in US railways, 26.0 per cent in Argentinian government or municipal bonds,
49.7 per cent in US utilities, and 13.2 per cent in Mexican or Brazilian railways.
In contrast, there were also trusts without any fixed interest investment in these
sectors.
Table 6 highlights the dominance of fixed interest securities (64.7 per cent of
portfolios on average) compared with ordinary and preferred shares as favoured
securities for investment trusts. However, it also highlights the perhaps more
surprising fact that the average investment in ordinary shares by investment trusts
exceeded that in less risky preferred shares, 20.4 per cent to 14.9 per cent.
Investment in ordinary shares was spread across a number of different sectors
and countries, with the most popular sector being the UK financial and investment
trusts, with an average of 3 per cent for the whole period. Other points to note are
that the ordinary shares of Argentinian railways were more popular, on average,
with investment trusts than were ordinary shares in less distant UK ICA firms
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Table 6. Investment trust portfolio weights according to security type
(% of portfolio nominal value)
Security type Country Sector Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Min. Quart. 1 Quart. 3 Max.
Ordinary shares All All 115 20.4 21.2 10.8 1.5 11.6 26.4 52.3
1 UK Trusts 115 3.0 2.7 2.7 0.0 0.6 4.6 12.1
2 Argentina Railways 115 2.1 1.4 2.2 0.0 0.6 2.8 9.2
3 UK ICA 115 1.8 1.3 1.8 0.0 0.4 2.9 9.3
4 US Railways 115 1.6 0.7 2.2 0.0 0.0 2.4 12.1
5 US ICA 115 1.3 0.8 1.5 0.0 0.1 2.0 6.9
6 UK Utilities 115 1.0 0.6 1.2 0.0 0.1 1.6 4.9
7 Brazil Railways 115 0.8 0.5 0.9 0.0 0.0 1.2 3.7
8 UK Finance 115 0.7 0.2 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.8 6.1
9 Australia Finance 115 0.7 0.3 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.9 13.6
10 US Utilities 115 0.6 0.4 1.0 0.0 0.1 0.8 8.2
Preferred shares All All 115 14.8 13.8 8.7 0.7 9.5 19.6 44.3
1 UK ICA 115 2.8 1.6 3.6 0.0 0.3 3.4 15.4
2 US ICA 115 2.2 1.2 2.6 0.0 0.3 3.3 14.4
3 US Railways 115 1.6 0.8 2.9 0.0 0.0 2.1 26.4
4 UK Utilities 115 1.3 0.5 2.1 0.0 0.0 1.4 8.9
5 Argentina Railways 115 1.2 0.7 1.2 0.0 0.2 1.9 5.2
6 UK Trusts 115 1.0 0.7 1.0 0.0 0.2 1.4 4.6
7 Mexico Railways 115 0.4 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.7 3.4
8 Argentina Utilities 115 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.4 3.7
9 Brazil Railways 115 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.5 2.6
10 US Utilities 115 0.3 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.3 4.1
Fixed interest securities All All 115 64.8 62.4 16.7 30.5 54.6 77.1 97.8
1 US Railways 115 12.5 8.7 14.7 0.0 3.5 15.6 75.9
2 UK ICA 115 4.9 2.6 7.4 0.0 1.3 5.0 42.9
3 US ICA 115 4.7 3.7 3.6 0.0 2.2 6.8 17.9
4 Argentina Government 115 4.4 3.2 4.7 0.0 0.2 6.9 26.0
5 Argentina Railways 115 3.8 3.5 3.0 0.0 1.2 5.5 13.5
6 US Utilities 115 3.7 2.0 6.6 0.0 0.5 4.8 49.7
7 Mexico Railways 115 2.7 2.6 2.0 0.0 1.1 3.8 13.2
8 Brazil Railways 115 2.7 2.6 2.0 0.0 1.1 3.8 13.2
9 Spain Railways 115 1.5 1.0 1.7 0.0 0.0 2.5 6.7
10 UK Utilities 115 1.4 0.6 1.9 0.0 0.2 1.9 10.9
Notes: Our calculations are based on the reported nominal portfolio values.
Source: Our dataset (see n. 23).
or utilities. On the other hand, the US and the UK market dominated portfolio
exposure in preferred shares.
The cross-sectional variation in portfolio strategies revealed by figures 2, 3, and 4
leads to the following questions: first, how closely did investment trusts stick to the
investment strategy implied in their names or embedded in their memoranda and
articles of association? Second, how persistent was portfolio selection with regard
to major sectors, security types, and countries for individual trusts?
In most cases, the name of the investment trust offers a general indication of
the underlying portfolio strategy. For instance, while someone could not guess the
portfolio selection of Alliance Trust just from the name, one could assume that
American Investment and General Trust would have a strong focus on American
securities. Indeed, this trust invested its whole portfolio (in nominal value terms)
in North American securities in 1886 and held 74 per cent of its portfolio in
North American securities and 23 per cent in Latin American securities by 1914.
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Similarly, International Investment Trust never invested more than 25 per cent
of its portfolio in domestic securities. Debenture Securities Investment Trust had
a preference for fixed interest securities, which in 1914 absorbed as much as 86
per cent of its nominal portfolio value. Railway Debenture and General Trust had
35 per cent of its portfolio nominal value invested in railway debentures in 1914.
United States and South American Investment Trust invested 98 per cent of its
portfolio in American securities in 1891 and 67 per cent in 1905. At least before the
First World War, UK investment trusts did not deviate much from the investment
missions implied by their names, although there were trusts whose names did not
reflect any particular investment strategy.
With respect to persistence, our background calculations show that each
investment trust had its own investment areas of interest, which it was reluctant
to dispose of. Overall, there was considerable cross-sectional variation among
investment trusts with respect to diversification and there was also portfolio
preference for specific investment zones that typically did not change too much
over time. This variation between individual investment strategies was not generally
affected by joint directorships.
VII
So far, our analysis has looked at the diversification strategies of investment trusts,
discussing how they structured their portfolios and how they distributed investment
across world regions, sectors, and security types. A logical follow-on questionwould
be to investigate the relationship between these portfolio structure choices and the
performance of the investment trusts. In this context, we can formulate two separate
questions. First, was the ‘global distribution of risk’ strategy pursued by investment
trusts beneficial to their shareholders? Second, was investment trust performance
related to specific asset allocation strategies?
One way to approach the first question would be to compare investment trust
performance with the performance of other financial sector firms, such as banks,
financial trusts, and Mortgage, Land, and Financial companies, which did not
apply the same breadth or depth of diversification. Figure 5 does that. For the
period between 1895 and 1913, the figure compares cumulative logarithmic returns
and Sharpe ratios (based on simple arithmetic returns) of the ordinary shares
of an unweighted portfolio of ‘average’ investment trusts with two, alternative
unweighted portfolios, one of banks and one of ‘other financial firms’ including
financial trusts and companies categorized as ‘Mortgage, Land, Financial etc.’.62
The notes to figure 5 offer some details as to our calculations. Returns of ordinary
shares include both dividends and capital gains over time. The assumption is that
62 Following financial research convention, these three portfolios are basically index funds, that is, portfolios that
include holdings of all the securities of a given type; Sharpe, Investors and markets. As we see in online app. tab. S2,
the bank and investment trust sector samples each include 30 ordinary shares, while the sample of financial firms
includes 17 ordinary shares. These numbers are driven by the data available from the Investor’s Monthly Manual
(IMM) dataset, which is the main data source for these calculations. The three portfolios are unweighted index
funds and include those ordinary shares that are consistently reported by the IMM on a monthly basis between
1895 and 1913 for the three sectors chosen. For a comprehensive discussion of the security coverage of the IMM,
see Hannah, ‘London Stock Exchange’. In our calculations of cumulative returns, we have used the logarithmic
definition; see notes to fig. 5.
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Figure 5. Performance of investment trusts in relation to the rest of financial sector
Notes: The chart shows cumulative logarithmic returns of ordinary shares for three different portfolios of financial sector firms
between 1895 and 1913. Our calculations are based on monthly returns of ordinary shares. For a single month period, the
logarithmic return of a security is defined as follows: rt = log(Pt+Dt)-log(Pt-1); where Pt is the market price of the ordinary share
in the end of month t, Dt is the dividend in month t, and Pt-1 the market price in the end of the previous month. The figure also
reports average annualized returns, annualized standard deviations, and corresponding Sharpe ratios based on simple arithmetic
returns. The simple arithmetic return is defined as follows: Rt = (Pt-Pt-1+Dt)/Pt-1. A detailed list of the firms included in the three
portfolios can be found in online app. tab. S2. The portfolio return is the unweighted average of the individual returns of the firms
it comprises. According to financial terminology, the three portfolios in the chart are index funds. The Sharpe ratio measures the
performance of each portfolio compared to a risk-free asset. In our calculations we used Consols as risk-free asset. In that case, to
get the Sharpe ratio we divide the mean monthly difference between the portfolio simple returns and the risk-free return by the
standard deviation of this difference.
Sources: Investor’s Monthly Manual (IMM) dataset. IMM data have been transformed into an electronic database: International
Center for Finance at Yale University, ‘London Stock Exchange, Investor Monthly Manual 1869 –1929’, https://som.yale.edu/facul
ty-research/our-centers-initiatives/international-center-finance/data/historical-financial-research-data/london-stock-exchange.
the actual performance obtained by an investor depends on the market returns
of the ordinary shares. The charts in figure 5 basically show how much the total
multiperiod logarithmic return would have been for an investor, if they had invested
£1 in January 1895 in each portfolio. The Sharpe ratio is a standard measure of
risk-adjusted returns. It captures the return that an investor receives relative to the
return on a risk-free asset per unit of risk.63 In our calculations we use Consols as
the risk-free asset.
63 For a discussion of this point, see Sharpe, Investors and markets. The conventional assumption in this line of
research is that the rate of return on ordinary shares is the best measure of investment performance. However, this
is not enough. A higher return can be a reward for taking greater risks by, for instance, picking riskier portfolio
assets; issuing a higher proportion of fixed income liabilities (bonds and preferred shares); and so on. A more
appropriate performance measure is one that can capture risk-adjusted returns. In our calculations, we have
adopted the Sharpe ratio, which is a standard measure of risk-adjusted return (return per unit of risk). Despite
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It is evident from figure 5 that investment trusts were very successful in delivering
higher risk-adjusted returns and cumulative investment returns. If an investor had
put £1 in an unweighted portfolio of investment trusts in January 1895, they would
have ended up with much higher returns in relation to banks and other financial
firms. This superior performance is reflected in both average annual returns and
risk-adjusted annual returns, as we see at the bottom of figure 5. Assuming an
unbiased selection of firms in each portfolio, the results offer evidence that the
specific goal of investment trusts—namely, the global distribution of risk64—was
indeed beneficial for their shareholders.65
The analysis in the previous sections also revealed relatively large cross-sectional
variation in individual investment portfolio strategies.Was this variation in portfolio
selection related to performance? For instance, did investment trusts with a more
domestic focus perform better or worse? What was the performance of investment
trusts with a preference for Latin American securities? Table 7 reports pooled OLS
regression results for the following equation:
Sharpeit = α + β1 · PortInvestmentit + β2 · Ageit + β3 · PortValueit
+TimeEffectst + uit (1)
Sharpeit is the Sharpe ratio of the ordinary share of trust i in year t. As in figure 5,
the Sharpe ratio is calculated on the basis of monthly simple arithmetic return
rates, including dividends and capital gains. Since each investment trust i reported
its investment lists on a different month every year, Sharpeit is measured over the
preceding 24 months from the accounting month. The Sharpe ratio is used here as
a measure of risk-adjusted return over Consols, which plays the role of the risk-free
asset in our calculations. Portfolio investment in different sectors or security types,
expressed as a ratio to portfolio value in nominal terms (PortInvestmentit), is the
main explanatory variable. Equation 1 also includes the nominal portfolio value in
£ millions (PortValueit), the age from incorporation (Ageit), and time effects (time
dummies for every year t except 1886, which is the first year in our sample). It is
a benchmark assumption in finance that firms on average perform better in good
its popularity, the Sharpe ratio is not the only measure of performance that has been suggested by the literature.
Each measure of risk-adjusted return has its own weaknesses. For a general discussion of the Sharpe ratio as a
measure of performance, see Lo, ‘Sharpe ratios’.
64 The concept of global diversification was a standard theme discussed in investment trust reports and in the
prospectuses of all investment trusts, not just the trusts in our sample. It was the essential element of their
business. For instance, the prospectus of the International Investment Trust in 1888 states that: ‘the advantages
which an Investor in these Trusts obtains is that his Capital is invested in a very large number of Securities in
such a manner that, by the principle of averages, he is able to obtain safely a higher return than he could if his
money were invested in only a few securities’; Guildhall Library, Company Annual Reports, item nos. 140–1.
The prospectus then goes on to explain the global diversification strategy in outline, arguing that its merits were
reflected in the particularly high ordinary yields of investment trusts. This was a standard argument in investment
trust documents and seems to agree with the results we present.
65 There are two caveats regarding the results of fig. 5. The calculations, like any ex post performance estimation,
are period-specific. The chart covers a period after the Baring Bank crisis, which affected all financial sectors.
Using ordinary shares from the Investor’s Monthly Manual, that were consistently reported over the whole period
between 1895 and 1913, may introduce some ‘survivor bias’ in our samples and comparisons. However, as
mentioned above, ‘average’ investment trusts did not go bankrupt, as opposed to some banks and some other
financial trusts and Financial, Land, and Investment companies. Thus, the portfolios of banks and other financial
companies include survivors, but the ‘average’ investment trusts do not. The relative performance of the latter
could thus be even stronger in relation to the other two sectors.
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times and worse in bad times.66 Time effects are thus important to control for the
influence of the market on individual firm performance, when we compare Sharpe
ratios on different years.
From the existing literature, the size and the age of a trust are standard
explanatory variables for performance that are relevant to closed-end funds in
our period.67 Larger funds are supposed to enjoy economies of scale, which
help diversification and performance. However, funds may grow too large to be
consistent with good management: larger portfolios could also be related to higher
portfolio monitoring and management costs. This is the reason why some studies
have tested a non-linear relation between the size of the funds (either in terms
of value or number of portfolio holdings) and their performance.68 The age of
an investment trust could also serve as a measure of management ability and
experience.
According to the results shown in table 7, for most of the categories of portfolio
investment there exists no statistically significant relationship to investment trust
performance. For instance, there is a negative coefficient forUKportfolio exposure,
indicating that a higher non-domestic investment would improve performance,
but it is not statistically significant. We get statistically significant results only for
investment in railways, in which the relationship with performance is positive, and
for investment in utilities, in which the relationship is negative. The basic message
from these results is that broad investment indicators cannot serve as predictors
of investment trust performance, which would depend on the specific structure of
the overall portfolio strategy.
Age, along with the investment experience attached to it, does not seem to
affect performance. Most of the trusts in our sample were well established in the
industry, so the time since incorporation would not necessarily be an indicator of
management experience. On the other hand, there is evidence that larger portfolios
are associated with higher risk-adjusted returns. Following the existing literature,
we also tested, in our background regressions, whether there is a non-linear
relationship between portfolio size, expressed either by nominal value or by number
of portfolio holdings, and investment trust performance. Despite economies of
scale, monitoring andmanaging portfolios could becomemore difficult as portfolio
size increases. However, we find no evidence of a non-linear relationship. A simple
explanation could be that managing a large portfolio does require skills but that,
even for large investment trusts, monitoring and management costs were relatively
low, due partly to low portfolio turnover. The Financial Times commented in 1908
that ‘experience has shown beyond possible doubt that a board of half a dozen
men or so can deal efficiently and successfully with at least £3 million worth of
66 Indeed, this is the main assumption of the so-called capital asset pricing model (CAPM); see Sharpe, Investors
and markets. The CAPM does not hold very well in practice, but the insight that firms perform better in ‘good
times’ underlies all asset pricing models.
67 Despite the fact that the literature on mutual fund performance is burgeoning, there is relatively little research
on the relation of performance to fund characteristics; see Annaert, van den Broeck, and Vander Vennet, ‘Mutual
fund underperformance’; Chen, Lee, Rahman, and Chan, ‘Market timing’; Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubic,
‘Fund size’; Ackermann, McEnally, and Ravenscraft, ‘Performance’; Ferreiera, Keswani, Miguel, and Ramos,
‘Mutual fund performance’.
68 See Shawky and Smith, ‘Optimal number’.
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investment’.69 This implies that portfolio monitoring costs were not very high and
could easily be undertaken by a small group of directors.
VIII
Asset management is a core, sophisticated activity in modern financial markets.
Professional asset management has a long history, which is intertwined with the rise
and development of financial markets. Before the FirstWorldWar investment trusts
were certainly the most dynamic financial group pursuing portfolio selection at the
global level. UK investment trusts were at the forefront of financial innovation. The
world was, indeed, their oyster. This study is the first comprehensive attempt to
investigate professional asset management in the UK before the First World War.
It reveals that asset management by UK closed-end investment trust companies
was a very advanced business based on extensive management of large portfolios.
Our findings reveal that asset management was a sophisticated activity before
the First World War. Investment trust directors were managing portfolios with
hundreds of holdings and a low but by no means negligible annual turnover. There
was significant cross-sectional variation in asset allocation at the firm level, which
means that investment trusts avoided copying each other’s strategies. Each trust
developed its own investment strategy focusing on different countries, sectors, and
security types, which did not change much over time. Despite this cross-sectional
variation, there are some general trends. UK investment trust portfolios had a
high proportion of their assets in overseas securities. They predominantly pursued
global diversification strategies, which proved quite successful relative to the rest
of the UK financial sector. UK investment trusts were relatively little attracted to
domestic securities and increasingly uninterested in European assets. The great
bulk of investment went to North and Latin American securities. Investment trusts
preferred industrial sectors over government securities and became gradually more
open to equity.
This article invites further research by economic historians on the history of
institutional investors. It offers a methodology based on primary sources which can
easily be extended to the study of professional asset management across different
institutional investors and periods. A wide range of questions with regard to the
history of financial innovation, portfolio investment, and their economic and social
implications remains to be addressed.
DOI: 10.1111/ehr.12994
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